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RECENT CASE NOTES
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and CreditLocal Public Policy
P recovered judgment against D in a Vermont court for the
alienation of affections of P's husband. The tort was primarily committed in New York, but was unenforceable there due to a statute
which provided: "No act ... done within this State shall operate to
give rise either within or without this state, to any cause of action
abolished by this article." P then sued in a New York court for
judgment on the Vermont judgment and recovered. D appealed on
the theory that the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution does not require a state to enforce a foreign judgment
based on a cause of action which violates its manifest public policy.
Held: As there is no constitutional question regarding the validity
of the New York statute outlawing causes of action for alienation of
affections, the appeal is dismissed and the Vermont judgment is
accorded full faith and credit. Parker v. Hoefer, 1 N.Y.2d 873, 136
N.E.2d 709 (1956).
Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution provides that
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the . . . judicial
proceedings of every other state." Pursuant to this, Congress has
directed that every state must allow judgments of the courts of sister
states " . . . the same full faith and credit ... as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State from which they are taken."
28 U.S.C. § § 1738, 1739 (1948). See Hampton v. McConnel, 4 U.S.

(3 Wheat.) 207 (1818). But for a judgment to be entitled to full
faith and credit, it is an absolute necessity for the original court to
have had actual jurisdiction of both the subject matter of the suit
and the parties thereto, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), and
the defendant may resort to evidence aliunde the record to prove that
jurisdiction of either the subject matter or parties is lacking. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
Equally well established law under the full faith and credit clause
is the general rule that if it is a valid judgment sued upon, the court
in which the second judgment is sought may not look to the merits
of the original decision, but must enforce it no matter how gross the
error of fact or law upon which it is based. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210
U.S. 230 (1908); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1927). And
see Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1886). Further,
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it is a well-established conflict of laws rule that the law of the place
where the tortious injury occurred will govern when the suit is
brought in a sister state. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933);
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). It might be
-thought that the operation of these two rules would be in conflict
if there is rendered a valid foreign judgment based upon an erroneous
interpretation of the substantive law of the place where the "tort"
occurred, for it is fundamental that if no cause of action existed in
the state where the "tortious" act happened, usually there cannot
be a correct recovery in a sister state even though that jurisdiction
does recognise a cause of action. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v.
Phillips, 174 Ark. 1019, 298 S.W. 325 (1927); Howard v. Howard,
200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931); Ewell v. Cardinal, 53 R.I. 469,
167 Atl. 533 (1933). Nevertheless, the full faith and credit clause
controls and the valid foreign judgment must be enforced, even
though it is based on a mistake of law and is against the statutory
public policy of the forum. Fauntleroyv. Lum, supra. However, there
are a few situations which will permit a state to refuse enforcement
of a foreign judgment, viz.: where the foreign court lacked jurisdiction (treated above); where the judgment is procured by certain
types of fraud, or is penal in nature; or where the local judicial
machinery will not accommodate the judgment in question. See
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS

111 (2d. ed. 1951).

The last mentioned "exception" has arisen in two situations: (1)
where procedural jurisdiction of the local courts does not encompass
the relief sought, and (2) where the local judicial machinery is
incompetent to enforce the foreign judgment. As to the former,
if a local court of general jurisdiction lacks the power to adjudicate
issues between the parties, the full faith and credit clause does not
require the state to provide a competent court. See Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903), where
it was held that New York courts of general jurisdiction lacked the
power to hear cases where all parties were foreign corporations not
doing business in New York. But a state may not defeat the full
faith and credit clause in favor of its own public policy merely by
limiting the jurisdiction of its courts, if the limitation goes only to
the merits of the case. Fauntleroy v. Lur, supra; Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). Further, the limitation is
ineffective as to foreign judgments unless it is solely of a procedural
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nature which deprives the court of power to act in that general type

of case. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., supra.
A statute which purports to deprive the court of jurisdiction to
render a judgment on a foreign judgment (based upon a cause of
action the substantive merits of which violate the state's public policy)
will not negative the effect of the full faith and credit clause.
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose,
252 U.S. 411 (1920).
As to the second situation where the exception has arisen, i.e.,
where the local judicial machinery is inadequate, the full faith and
credit clause does not dictate that new procedures must be adopted
to enforce foreign judgments. Masci v. Young, 109 N.J.L. 453, 162
Atl. 623 (1932), aff'd, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), supra; Mertz v. Mertz,
271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Weidman v. Weidman, 274
Mass. 118, 174 N.E. 206 (1931) (full faith and credit denied in
equity where only the law courts had power over that subject
matter).
It is evident from the above that the statutes, case law, and public
policy of each state are almost at the mercy of the interpretation
and construction accorded it by courts of sister states. To counteract
the undesirable enforcement of erroneous foreign judgments, some
courts have allowed the local judgment debtor a cause of action
against the resident plaintiff who goes to another state and recovers
judgment, possibly erroneous, which is enforced locally under the
full faith and credit clause. For example, where wages due a Texas
resident from his railroad employer were garnished in California
(garnishment of wages due is illegal in Texas), the Texas resident
was allowed to recover damages for wrongful garnishment, thus
indirectly vindicating this Texas public policy and discouraging
future infractions. Hall's Clothing Co. v. Ramirez, 184 S.W.2d 296
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error dism.
In the principal case, the public policy of New York was clearly
violated, for the alienation of affections of P's husband did not constitute an actionable tort in New York where the act primarily occurred, and it follows that the correct conflict of laws rule would
require judgment in another state to be for D, regardless of the
law of the state where the suit is brought. Neverthless, New York
courts, bound by the mandate of the full faith and credit clause,
were forced to give effect to the erroneous Vermont judgment.
Perhaps a state desiring to protect its more important public policies
from abusive violations under the full faith and credit clause, can
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do so constitutionally by creating a cause of action in favor of the
resident held liable under such a foreign judgment. This would be
a more effective remedy in practice than that now available, viz.:
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court for reversal of the
erroneous foreign judgment. Otherwise the courts of sister states,

by applying erroneous conflict of laws principles, are in effect making law for one another.
Morton L. Susman

Evidence-Admissibility of Confessions-Effect of
Illegal Detention
D and two other suspects were arrested at 2:30 p.m. and taken to
police headquarters in the District of Columbia. Sometime after 9:30
p.m., D confessed to the crime of which he was suspected. The police
then attempted for the first time to contact a magistrate with whom
they could file charges against D. D contended that the confession
was illegal and inadmissible as evidence since it was procured during
illegal detention, inasmuch as the federal officers did not take him
before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. Held: A
delay of seven hours before filing charges is not unreasonable and
does not give rise to an illegal detention where the prisoner is one
of three suspects, since the police should not be required to file
charges until they develop some justification for them; further, a
confession must have been obtained as a result of the delay to be
inadmissible. Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.
1956), cert. granted, 352 U. S. 877 (1956).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "An officer
making an arrest ... shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay . . ." before a committing magistrate and that " . . . a
complaint shall be filed forthwith." FED. R. CrUM. P. 5 (a). This rule
was construed by the Supreme Court to impose on federal officers a
positive legal duty to commit promptly; a breach of that duty will
cause a detention thereafter to be illegal and a confession obtained
during that period inadmissible if the circumstances surrounding the
detention and disclosure show physical or psychological coercion
which is a flagrant disregard of the procedure prescribed by Congress.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942); cf. United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). The McNabb rule was later expanded
in effect by the Court's statement that such a confession was inadmissible whether or not it was the result of torture, physical or psychological. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1949). This ap-
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parently made illegal detention alone enough to cause a confession to
be barred. See Comment, Admissibility of Confessions Obtained
During Illegal Detention, 3 Sw.L.J. 452 (1949). However, a confession is admissible if the detention which preceded it was lawful, even
though the confession be followed by an illegal detention. United
States v. Mitchell, supra. Further, a confession made to one crime
while the suspect is being legally detained in connection with another
crime is admissible, even though the prisoner has not been committed
for the crime to which he confesses. United States v. Carignan, 342
U.S. 36 (1950).
Seemingly, the Court in this case has reverted to the McNabb rule
and ignored the Upshaw interpretation by saying that the confession
must have been produced by the detention to be inadmissible. This
accords with previous holdings of the same court, as, e.g., Pierce v.
United States, 197 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
346 (1952), in which it was held that the Upshaw case did not overturn the principle that an ' ...illegal detention before presentment
to a committing magistrate, standing alone and without more, does
not invalidate a confession made during its continuance, unless the
detention produced the disclosure." This same court held in Akowskey
v. United States, 158 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1946), that where the
prisoners were within close proximity to persons authorized to commit
but nevertheless were taken to police headquarters, the detention was
illegal and any subsequent disclosure inadmissible as evidence.
Thus, it is seen that the federal courts for the District of Columbia
have re-interpreted the Upshaw rule. Other circuits have circumvented the rule by allowing the federal trial courts a large amount of
discretion in determining whether or not the delay in arraignment
was necessary in the circumstances, recognizing that if the delay
was not unreasonable, the detention would not be illegal and the
Upshaw rule would not be applicable. See, e.g., White v. United
States, 200 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Leviton, 193
F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1951). At least
one circuit has expressly refused to follow the holding that the timing
of the confession and commitment is controlling. Haines v. United
States, 188 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888
(1951). Texas accords with the principal case, holding that a failure
to carry an accused before a magistrate vitiates a confession only
when there is some casual connection between the failure and the
subsequent confession. Walker v. State, 286 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 931 (1956).
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The foregoing decisions indicate that the federal courts have been
reluctant to follow the Upshaw rule in its strict sense. Instead, they
have seized upon explanatory language in the Upshaw case to
give effect to a less stringent requirement, saying that it is not the
time of arraignment that makes the detention illegal and the confession inadmissible, but rather the circumstances of the case. The
District of Columbia court has gone even further, holding that the
illegal or unnecessary detention must produce the disclosure to render
it inadmissible as evidence. It is apparent that these courts feel that
a breach of the duty to commit promptly does not justify a complete
vitiation of a confession. However, the federal courts do apply either
the McNabb or Upshaw rule in instances where the arresting officers
have verged on a violation of due process in their methods of securing
a disclosure from a prisoner. The result is that the rule of the Upshaw
case now occupies a curious position, being used only when the courts
wish to reach a desired result but seemingly do not choose to base
their decision on due process.
The Upshaw rule has been criticized by writers, Comments, 27
N.C.L. Rev. 552 (1949), 23 So. Calif. L. Rev. 63 (1949), and ignored, repudiated, or confined to its facts by the federal courts. However, it may well be that the Court in the Upshaw case, where the
detention was for thirty hours, recognized the difficulty faced by an
accused in proving that his confession was tortured from him so
as to violate due process of law or that the disclosure was caused
as a direct result of the detention. If this was the reason for the decision, the Court will be faced with the problem in this case of determining whether a detention of only seven hours should bar the
disclosure without a showing of coercion. The difficulty of proving
wrongful acts by officers in securing the confession is the same,
whether the defendant be held seven hours or thirty hours. These
considerations could well be the basis for a re-affirmation of the
Upshaw case and the application of the principle to these facts, even
though the period of detention was of a shorter duration.
Eugene L. Smith

Evidence-Dead Man's Statute-Interested Parties
In 1948, Dr. Howard Ditto agreed with James Ditto to render
medical care to the latter, payment for which would be by the estate
of James Ditto upon his death. James Ditto died in 1953, and Dr.
Ditto presented a bill to the independent executor who refused to
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pay it. Thereafter, Dr. Ditto gratuitously assigned the claim to his
wife as her separate property, whereupon she assigned the claim to
the Ditto Investment Company, a corporation owned by her. The
Company brought this action upon the claim and offered Dr. Ditto's
testimony. Held: Article 3716 did not disqualify Dr. Ditto from
testifying as to his agreement with James Ditto, because he had assigned his claim and had no actual interest in it. Ditto Investment
Co. v. Ditto, 293 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
Article 3716, commonly referred to as the Dead Man's Statute,

provides that "[i]n actions by or against executors . . . in which
judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither
party shall be allowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator . . . ; and the provisions

of this article shall extend to and include all actions by or against
the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out of any
transaction with such decedent." TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. (1926).
Thus, in order for the statute to exclude testimony the action must
be one contemplated by the statute, the testimony offered must be
as to a "transaction" with the deceased, and the party seeking to
testify must be a party within the meaning of the statute.
The principal case met the first of the three requirements inasmuch as it was an action against an executor. The test of the second
requirement, i.e., a transaction with the deceased, has been held to
be whether the facts present a situation by which, as a basis for a
cause of action, one person can derive impressions or information
from the conduct, condition or language of the deceased. Andreades
v. McMillan, 256 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error dism.
Thus an oral contract, such as that in the instant case, has been
held to be a transaction with the deceased. Madero v. Calzado, 281
S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
The word "party" as used in the statute includes parties of record;
all parties enumerated in the statute, and those who have an actual
and direct interest in the subject matter of the transaction. Ragsdale
v. Ragsdale, 142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291 (1944); Simpson v.
Brotherton, 62 Tex. 170 (1884). The criterion of an actual and
direct interest is whether the witness will be bound by the judgment
to be rendered under the pleadings. Corbell v. Kogg, 188 S.W.2d
905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. Former parties who have parted
with all of their interest before the suit is filed are not incompetent, and this is true even though a witness conveyed his interest
in the estate of the deceased primarily to remove his disability.
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May v. Brown, 144 Tex. 350, 190 S.W.2d 715 (1945); Turner v.
Hodges' Estate, 219 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref.
n.r.e. If, however, the conveyance of the claim against the deceased
was simulated in order to circumvent the statute when, in fact, the
actual ownership or beneficial interest in the claim remained in the
grantor, the witness so acting has been held to possess such an in-

terest as to constitute him a party within the statute. Sheffield v.
Leech, 221 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, supra. In the case at hand, the court found the conveyance
to be a valid one, and that Dr. Ditto had no such interest to bar
his testimony.
The plaintiff in the principal case, a corporation, was a "person,"
having power to own property within the purposes outlined in its
charter and possessing all rights that a natural person may.have in
actions for or against it. Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, Tex.-, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956); Pittsburg Water Heater Co. of
Texas v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926). Ownership
of property is in the corporation as such and not in the stockholders.
Rogers-Hill and Co. v. San Antonio Hotel Co., 23 S.W.2d 329
(Tex. Comm. App. 1930). This rule applies although the property
(chose in action in the principal case) was received by assignment
from a stockholder; further, the stockholder is not a necessary
party to a suit by the corporation on such chose in action. Lottman
Bros. Manufacturing Co. v. Houston Waterworks Co., 38 S.W. 357
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896). The Dead Man's Statute does not apply to
officers or employees of a corporation because they are not parties
to actions by or against corproations. Thompson v. McAllen Federated Woman's Building Corporation, 273 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954) error dism.; San Antonio Light Pub. Co. v. Moore,
101 S.W. 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref. Thus, had the testimony of Dr. Ditto's wife been offered in the principal case, she
probably would have been qualified to testify.
It is submitted that the present decision correctly observed the
controlling legal precedents; furthermore, by allowing collection
of what appears to be a legitimate claim it is, at least to this extent,
a desirable application of the law. Nevertheless, according to Texas
community property law, i.e., that revenue from the wife's corporate investments is community property, it would seem that Dr.
Ditto, although not having an interest sufficient to constitute him
a party under the statute, did have a direct interest in the outcome

of the suit. Yet, through assignment, he has substantially accom-
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plished a result which the law probably would have denied had he
proceeded directly against the estate. Such a result serves to illus-

trate the inconsistencies which arise under the present interpretation
of the Dead Man's Statute. It would seem that uniformity may be

obtained only by proper legislative action. See Ray, The Dead Man's
Statute-A Relic of the Past, 10 Sw.L.J. 390 (1956).

R. W. Calloway

Family Law and Community Property-Putative
Marriage-Division of Property
Certain realty was acquired in the name of W2 during her putative marriage to H. Upon H's death, W2 brought an action against
W1 and H's heirs to determine title to the property. Held: A putative
marriage entered in good faith by both parties establishes a "putative
community," and any property acquired during such marriage will
be distributed by giving an undivided one-fourth interest therein
to both the legal and the putative wife, and the remaining undivided
one-half interest to the husband or his heirs. Prince v. Hopson,
-La.-, 89 So.2d 128 (1956).
A putative marriage arises when at least one of the two parties
to a purported ceremonial or common law marriage has acted in
good faith and in ignorance of existing impediments which render
it unlawful. Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 628 (1846); Hupp v. Hupp,
235 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e. The interests
of innocent parties in property acquired during the putative marriage are now recognized by a majority of states, although justified
on such diverse principles as partnership, King v. Jackson, 196 Okla.
327, 164 P.2d 974 (1945); resulting trusts, Titus v. Titus, 151 Kan.
824, 101 P.2d 872 (1940); community property, Union Bank and
Trust Co. v. Gordon, 116 Cal. App.2d 681, 254 P.2d 644 (1953);
or equity, Fowler v. Fowler, 97 N.H. 216, 84 A.2d 836 (1951).
The principal case was controlled by LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 117
(West 1952), which is a literal translation of Article 201 of the
French Civil Code; therefore, the Court turned to the French commentators for aid in interpreting the statute. According to the
interpretation of the commentators, the statute affords the putative
wife all of the rights of a legal wife; hence, the putative wife is
entitled to one-half of all of the property acquired during the
putative marriage. Since the putative marriage does not terminate
the legal marriage, the legal wife is entitled to the same one-half
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of the property. The two claims with regard to the same property
being equal in nature, the only equitable division that could be
effected would be to split the property acquired during the putative
marriage and give each wife one-fourth. This interpretation of the
statute is referred to as the "Putative Wife Doctrine."
The law in Texas is settled as to the interest of the husband and
the legal and putative wives in property acquired during the putative
marriage. Assuming the property would ordinarily have a community
character, the putative wife receives an undivided one-half interest
in the property, and the husband and legal wife have a community
estate in the remainder. Routh v. Routh, 57 Tex. 589 (1882);
Mathews v. Mathews, 292 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956);
Morgan v. Morgan, 21 S.W. 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892). Although
the Texas division thus differs from that of Louisiana, the Texas
courts often have purported to follow the "Putative Wife Doctrine"
in holding that the putative wife has the rights of a lawful wife as
to all property acquired during the putative marriage. Barkley v.
Dumke, 99 Tex. 150, 87 S.W. 1147 (1905). Although this language
was denounced as early as 1910, Ft. Worth &4R.G.R. Co. v. Robert-

son, 103 Tex. 504, 131 S.W. 400 (1910), the proposition continues
to appear from time to time. Cameron v. Cameron, 103 S.W.2d
464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). The Robertson case rested the property
division squarely on partnership principles and refused to allow the
putative wife an interest in property acquired without contribution
on her part.
Notwithstanding language to the contrary in some Texas decisions, it is apparent that a putative wife does not have the rights
of a lawful wife in Texas. A chose in action accruing to the husband
as a result of personal injuries is community property, but it has
been held that the putative wife may not maintain the action.
Ft. Worth & R.G.R. Co. v. Robertson, supra. Nor does the putative

wife have an action for the wrongful death of her husband under
the Wrongful Death Statute or the Workmens' Compensation Laws.
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Grimes, 153 Tex. 357, 269 S.W.2d
332 (1954). The putative wife has no homestead rights, Middleton
v. Johnston, 110 S.W. 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) error ref., and
she can neither inherit the husband's separate property nor administer

his estate. Morgan v. Morgan, supra; Chapman v. Chapman, 32
S.W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901). These cases are not in conflict

with the partnership theory for in none of them did the putative
wife contribute to the acquisition of the property. Furthermore,
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none of the cases purporting to follow the Putative Wife Doctrine
have reached a result different from that which would have been
reached had they followed partnership principles, i.e., none have
involved property acquired other than by joint effort. The division
arrived at has been the same regardless of the theory utilized. Lee
v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923); Morgan v. Morgan,

supra.
It is submitted that language in the Texas decisions to the effect
that a putative wife has the rights of a lawful wife is meaningless,
since the putative wife is afforded no rights whatsoever unless she
has contributed to the acquisition of the property to which she is
asserting a claim. If the Texas courts were following the Putative
Wife Doctrine and the putative wife did have the rights of a lawful
wife, the Texas division would necessarily be the same as that of
Louisiana.
George B. Davis

Liens-Sale Under Deed of Trust-Cancellation by

Mortgagor's Administrator
The administrator of the estate of a deceased mortgagor of nonhomestead real property brought suit to set aside a sale of the property
made, after the mortgagor's death, under a power of sale in a deed
of trust. There was no evidence of claims against the estate of higher
priority than secured claims. Held: An administrator may set aside
a deed of trust sale made within four years after the death of the
mortgagor even though there is no evidence of debts of a higher
priority. Pearce v. Stokes, -Tex.-, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956).
The power of sale contained in a deed of trust is designed to
assure the creditor of a swift mode of foreclosure without the
delay and expense of a law suit, Blackwell v. Barnett, 52 Tex. 326
(1879), and because this power is coupled with an interest, it
survives the death of the mortgagor. Natali v. Witthaus, 135 S.W.2d
969 (Tex. Comm. App. 1940); Wiener v. Zwieb, 105 Tex. 262,
141 S.W. 771 (1911). The process of estate administration also is
designed to protect the interests of creditors in that it attempts to
assure each creditor of the deceased fair consideration and prompt
settlement. Palfrey v. Harborth, 158 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942) error ref.; Ryan's Administrator v. Flint and Chamberlain,
30 Tex. 382 (1867). Although these safeguards usually operate
independently of each other, under certain circumstances they may

SOUTHWESTERN

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

come into conflict, and questions of precedence arise. Thus, it is
generally held that administration suspends the power of sale and
that a sale made by the mortgagee while administration is pending
is void. Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 472 (1856). On the other hand,
the sale will be valid if there is no administration within four years
of the mortgagor's death, Wiener v. Zwieb, supra, or if the estate
is handled by an independent executor, Smith v. San Antonio Joint
Stock Land Bank, 130 S.W.2d 1070 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error
ref., or if the sale is made after the expiration of four years from
the date of the death of the grantor, no administration being opened
on the estate of the deceased. Heirs of Roger v. Watson, 81 Tex.
400, 17 S.W. 29 (1891).

The mortgagee in the principal case contended that a sale made
within four years of the death of the mortgagor may not be set
aside at the instance of an administrator except upon proof that
there are claims against the estate of higher priority than the
secured debt of the mortgagee. This argument apparently had never
been raised before in Texas, and the Court of Civil Appeals was
of the opinion that the sale should be set aside if it interfered with
the administration of the estate. Stokes v. Pearce, 285 S.W.2d 475
(1955). In holding that the administrator, unconditionally, may
set aside the sale, the Supreme Court was governed by such considerations as the realization that administration is for the protection
of all creditors, the fact that the purpose of a mortgage is security
and not the acquisition of property, and the desire for greater certainty. Thus, the Court's ultimate decision was grounded on policy
considerations; it was indicated that, as a result of the decision,
mortgagees would be encouraged to pursue their remedy in an
administration proceeding since they would be bound to know
that any sale made after the death of the mortgagor and within
four years thereof could be cancelled at the instance of an administrator should administration be opened.
The Court in the instant case was confronted with the age-old
problem of two innocent parties, one of whom must suffer. Should
the administration be effectuated and priority creditors protected,
e.g., funeral, last sickness, administration expenses, Palfrey v. Harborth, 158 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref., or should

the mortgagee be protected in his power of sale? If the mortgagee
is favored, the priority creditors may receive nothing or substantially less than they are due. However, the result of the present
decision is that the mortgagee's power of sale is weakened con-
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siderably. If there are priority creditors, the mortgagee likely will
receive only partial payment. One should also consider the problem
of a bidder at the foreclosure sale whose purchase will be subject
to revocation for four years. See dissent in Wiener v. Zwieb, supra.
Although the mortgagee may always open administration proceedings himself, thereby avoiding this problem, he will incur additional
expenses by doing so. TEX. Rv. CIv. STAT. (1925), PROBATE CODE,
§ 178(b); Ragsdale v. Prather, 132 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) error ref.

In summary, from the standpoint of policy there seems little to
choose between a decision favoring the administrator or the mortgagee. It is submitted that the present decision is not objectionable
since the curtailment of one or the other's rights is essential to
certainty in the law.
Marshall S. McCrea, Jr.

Oil and Gas-Construction of InstrumentsAfter-Acquired Title
P owned an undivided 1/40th interest in a tract of land. Together
with her relatives, who owned an undivided 8/40ths interest, P executed an oil and gas lease upon printed form to D which purported
to convey all of the oil and gas and other minerals in the tract. The
lease provided for an oil payment and a delay rental, each being
equivalent to 9/40ths of the mineral interest. In addition, a royalty
of 1/8th of the oil and gas produced from said land was reserved to
the lessor. A warranty clause covering the entire tract was included,
but the proportionate reduction clause had been marked out before
the lease was signed. When the lease was executed, D and his associates owned 31/40ths of the mineral interest. P contended she was
entitled, as royalty, to 1/72nd of the oil and gas produced. Held: P
is entitled to 1/9th of 40/40ths of 1/8th on the oil produced from
the land as provided for in the lease agreement rather than 1/40th
of 1/8th as contended by D. Gibson v. Turner, -Tex.-, 294
S.W.2d 781 (1956), 6 OIL & GAS REP. 1212.
In construing the lease in question, under which the lessor overconveyed and in which the proportionate reduction clause was
marked out, the majority of the Court applied certain well-settled
principles of legal instrument construction in determining the plaintiff's royalty interest. First, in a collateral attack on an unambiguous
mineral lease or other written instrument the court may not make
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a new instrument for the parties, nor may it refer to any source
other than the instrument as written in order to ascertain the intention of the parties. Texas Co. v. Parks, 247 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) error ref., 1 OIL & GAS REP. 555; Clemmens v. Kennedy,
68 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref. Further, it has been
held that Texas follows the "four corners" rule of construction.
Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953), 2 OIL
& GAS REP. 1350; Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 151 S.W.2d
1004 (1941). Third, there is nothing inconsistent in conveying all
the minerals one may own in land and in a separate paragraph reserving a royalty interest, because a royalty interest is unlike an interest in the minerals in place. Countiss v. Baldwin, 151 S.W.2d 235
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941). Finally, the owners of mineral interests may
make their fractional interest in royalties different from their fractional ownership of the mineral estate if they plainly express such
an intention. This follows because an oil and gas leasehold estate is not
synonymous with a royalty interest, and they may also be in a different quantum or amount. Benge v. Scharbauer, supra.
The defendant in the principal case contended that he was entitled
to recover for the breach of warranty because of failure to receive
the interest purportedly conveyed. It appears that there was a breach
of warranty because of the lessors' inability to convey the interest
which the deed purported to convey. However, it is well-settled that
a cause of action for breach of a covenant of general warranty will
not lie in the absence of an eviction. If the grantee is the owner of
the outstanding interest, as in the instant case, there can be no eviction since legal eviction cannot be predicated upon the voluntary
act of the grantee in evicting himself. Schneider v. Lipscomb County
National Farm Ass'n, 146 Tex. 66, 202 S.W.2d 832 (1947); Rancho
Bonito Land and Livestock Co. v. North, 92 Tex. 72, 45 S.W. 994
(1898). This same principle should apply to a mineral or royalty
interest since they are regarded as realty in Texas. Lockhart v. Williams, 144 Tex. 553, 192 S.W.2d 146 (1946); Stephens County v.
Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 132 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
The dissenting opinion contended that the royalty interest of the
plaintiff should be reduced, basing its opinion largely on Duhig v.
Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940),
a case which represented an extension of the doctrine of afteracquired title to a mineral estate reserved by the grantor. Classification of the doctrine as legal or equitable in nature has not been uniform. Some decisions treat it as an equity doctrine grounded on
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principles of estoppel. McKinnon v. Lane, 285 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e., 5 OIL & GAS REP. 607; Hanlon
v. McLain, 206 Okla. 227, 242 P.2d 732 (1952), 1 OIL & GAS REP.
862. Other cases hold that the title of a grantor, who has purportedly
conveyed the title by a general warranty deed, passes to his grantee
by operation of law immediately upon acquisition of such title by
the grantee. Such cases would appear to treat the doctrine as a legal
one. Breen v. Morehead, 126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd,
104 Tex. 254, 136 S.W. 1047 (1911). Some states have statutes
dealing with after-acquired title which also appear to make the doctrine one of law and not equity. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 17 (1951) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-404 (1947) ; KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 67-207 (1949).
The courts have not been uniform on the question of what gives
rise to the doctrine of after-acquired title. There is some authority
to the effect that an estoppel arises from the assertion of ownership
by the grantor in the covenant of warranty, express or implied, or
in other recitals of ownership in the deed. Talley v. Howsley, 142
Tex. 87, 176 S.W.2d 158 (1944); Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558,
161 S.W.2d 270 (1942). Other cases have held that the estoppel does
not depend upon the obligation or presence of the covenant of
warranty, but if the conveyance purports to transfer some certain
estate the grantor will be estopped, irrespective of the presence of
covenants, to assert that an estate did not pass by virtue of his deed.
Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892); Texas Pac.
Coal and Oil Co. v. Fox, 228 S.W. 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921);
Lowry v. Carter, 102 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.
See Comment, The Doctrine of After-Acquired Title, 11 Sw. L.J.,
217 (1957). Further, since a covenant of general warranty cannot
operate by estoppel to vest in the grantee a greater interest than the
deed itself would have conferred, Chase v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32
S.W. 520 (1895), it is doubtful that the courts would apply the
doctrine of after-acquired title to an estate reserved in a mineral
lease, because the estoppel arising from the doctrine is restricted to
the estate purportedly conveyed and is not applied to a reserved
estate. Talley v. Howsley, supra; McKinnon v. Lane, supra.
It is customary in the oil and gas industry for the lessee to take
a full interest lease though he may know that the lessor owns less
than the full mineral fee. The lessee is thus more certain to receive
whatever interest the lessor may have and he may operate the premises as a single unit so that interior offset problems will be eliminated
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and only one set of measuring tanks will be necessary in computing

the lessor's royalty. The lessee protects himself from the possibility
of having to pay a full 1/8th royalty on less than the entire mineral
fee by means of the proportionate reduction clause. However, it is
to be noted that the proportionate reduction clause does not operate
to reduce the estate which the lessor purported to convey, nor does
it nullify the warranty. Klein v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.,
126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935). The principal case points
out the difficulty in which the lessee may find himself if he allows
the proportionate reduction clause to be struck.
Since the royalty clause is contractual in nature and the deed does
not purport to convey the right given by such clause, it is not affected by a breach of warranty because the warranty does not extend
to the provisions in the deed as to the interest in royalties. Benge v.
Scharbauer, supra. However, it appears that the lessee in the instant
case could have recovered damages for the breach of warranty if the
outstanding interest had been owned by someone other than himself.
It is advisable that, to avoid problems with which the lessee was
confronted in the instant case, lessees insist that the proportionate
reduction clause be included in the lease. This clause would protect
the lessee in the event the royalty clause provided that the lessor was
entitled to more than his actual ownership, since the proportionate
reduction clause has the effect of reducing the lessor's royalty interest to coincide with his actual ownership of the mineral fee.
R. W. Calloway

Oil and Gas-Pollution of Subsurface WatersAbsolute Liability
P owned farm land on which he had a fresh water well. D, an oil
company, in the operation of an oil well on neighboring property,
constructed and maintained evaporation pits for salt water produced from the well. P's fresh water well became polluted by seepage
from D's salt water evaporation pits. Held: D is absolutely liable
for the pollution of the subsurface water supply which feeds P's
well because of Rule 20 of the Railroad Commission. Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 457 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956) error ref., n.r.e., -Tex.-, 295 S.W.2d 901 (1956).
Pollution of fresh water by the escape of waste products resulting
from oil and gas production is a problem common to all jurisdictions
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in which there is a large petroleum industry. In solving this problem,
some jurisdictions employ a rule of strict liability based on either a controlling legislative enactment, Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 202
Okla. 687, 217 P.2d 816 (1950), or the rule of strict liability as
announced in the leading English case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1
Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Wendtlandt v. National Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 168 Kan. 619, 215 P.2d 209

(1950). This rule finds liability even in the absence of negligence for
damages caused by the escape of a dangerous substance collected by
the defendant on his land in connection with a non-natural use to
which the defendant was putting his land. The doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher,supra, has not found extensive acceptance in this country.

PROSSER, "The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher," SELECTED Topics
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1953).

Most jurisdictions require proof of specific negligence as a basis of
liability for pollution caused by oil and gas production wastes. Jones,

Escape of Deleterious Substances: Strict Liability v. Liability Based
Upon Fault, 1 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 163, 194 (1955). Texas
is among these by virtue of the landmark case of Turner v. Big Lake
Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936), which expressly repudiated the doctrine of strict liability, except in the case of pollution of a public body of water which is specifically prohibited by
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 698b (1948). The instant case announces
a radical departure from the earlier Texas policy. Prior to the Turner
case there was some confusion in Texas law on pollution of waters
not public. Several early Civil Appeals decisions seemed to hold the
oil well operator strictly liable under a theory of private nuisance;
e. g., Teel v. Rio Brave Oil Co., 104 S.W. 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
This would involve a finding that the defendant was making an unreasonable use of his property in causing injury to the plaintiff. City
of Temple v. Mitchell, 180 S.W.2d 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). However, today certainly the drilling and operation of oil and gas wells is a
reasonable use of Texas property. Cosden Oil Co. v. Sides, 35 S.W.2d
815 (1931) ; Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., supra. It seems clear in the
light of the Turner case that in the absence of negligence no theory
of private nuisance will support a recovery for pollution caused by
the escape of wastes. Further, it has been held that in these circumstances negligence will not be presumed nor will the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur apply. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465,
271 S.W.2d 410 (1954).
The decision in the present case turns on the Court's interpretation
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of Rule 20 of the Railroad Commission which reads as follows:
"Fresh water, whether above or below the surface shall be protected
from pollution, whether in drilling, plugging or disposing of salt
water already produced." As the rule is stated, it is susceptible to at
least two interpretations. It may be viewed as a directive to oil well
operators that they must use reasonable care in protecting surface
and subsurface fresh water from pollution caused from operation of
their wells. This is in accord with the common law and would amount
to a recognition by the Commission of the holding in the Turner
case. Under this view there would be no liability without proof of
negligence. The Court, however, assumed that the rule imposes absolute liability on the operator. It then relied on the case of Peterson
v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd,
128 Tex. 550, 98 S.W.2d 781 (1936), which stands for the proposition that the failure to comply with a standard of conduct imposed
by a ruling of an administrative body may constitute actionable negligence. The Peterson case does not hold that the Commission has the
power to create liability in an individual, although the breach of the
duty imposed by the Commission in its ruling may give rise to liability on the basis of common law negligence. The interpretation
given the rule by the Court in the present case defines no standard
of conduct to guide the operator. It has the effect of creating a cause
of action in the plaintiff regardless of fault in the defendant.
It is submitted that if the Court's interpretation of Rule 20 is the
correct one, the Railroad Commission has exceeded the authority
granted it by the legislature. Ryan Corp. v. Pickens, -Tex.--,
285 S.W.2d 201 (1955); see discussion notes, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 460
(1956). The Commission is given the general powers of promoting
conservation of oil and gas and prohibiting their waste as defined by
the statutes. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, 6014, 6029
(1949). It is specifically empowered to make rules "To require wells
to be operated in such manner as to prevent injury to adjoining property." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 6029(4) (1949). Nowhere
is the Commission empowered to create liability as such. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the decision on other grounds, expressly reserved
its opinion of the position taken by the Court of Civil Appeals, so
the question is yet to be finally decided. If the Supreme Court should
find the Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating this rule,
then the rule would be void. Railroad Commission v. Rowan Oil Co.,
152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W.2d 173 (1953).
In these times of drought, any loss of fresh water by pollution is
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certainly to be viewed with concern, and every reasonable effort

should be exercised by all to prevent this pollution. Perhaps it would
be in the public interest for the oil industry to be held to a higher
degree of care than that enunciated in the Turner case. This may have

been in the mind of the Court when it rendered the decision in the
present case. However, any remedy forthcoming should emanate from
the legislature and not from an administrative body which is not
charged with correction of the problem.

David M. Woolley

Real Property-Adverse Possession-Tenant's
Attornment to, Owner
A tenant, after some six years adverse possession for his landlord,
executed a formal tenancy agreement with the true record owner.

Although the landlord was aware of the tenant's attornment to the
owner, he did nothing except warn the tenant not to acknowledge
again the title of the owner. After expiration of the Texas 10-year
Statute of Limitations, the owner brought this suit in trespass to try
title. Held: When both landlord and owner know of the tenant's
attornment to the owner, and the landlord fails to remove the tenant,
adverse possession is broken. Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Laird, 231 F.2d
812 (5th Cir. 1956).
It is well established in Texas that one may adversely hold land by
means of a tenant, Jack v. Dillon, 25 S.W. 645 (Tex. Civ. App.
1894) error ref.; Dawson v. Tumlinson, 150 Tex. 451, 242 S.W.2d
191 (1951); and that the tenant's possession inures to the benefit
of his landlord. Harris v. Iglehart, 113 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908). Further, the tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's
title. American Nat. Bank of Beaumont v. Wingate, 266 S.W.2d 934
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953 ) errorref. Thus, the tenant's acknowledgement
of a third party's title, e. g., acceptance of a lease, is ordinarily void as
to the landlord unless the latter has granted permission to his tenant
to make such attornment. Carter v. Townsend, 139 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940) error dism., judgm. cor.; Wiener v. Zweib, 128
S.W. 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd 105 Tex. 262, 141 S.W. 771
(1911), rehearing denied 105 Tex. 262, 147 S.W. 867 (1912). Nor
is the continuity of the adverse possession interrupted by the tenant's
attornment to a third party. Powell Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S.W.2d
774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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However, where the record owner of the property makes a lease
with one found in possession, and the owner has no notice of the
adverse claim of the tenant for his landlord, the adverse possession of
the tenant for his landlord has been held to be interrupted. Louisiana
& Texas Lmbr. Co. v. Alexander, 154 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913). On the other hand, the owner who makes a lease with one
found in possession has been charged with notice that the tenant has
no authority from his landlord to recognize the owner's title and so
interrupt adverse possession of his landlord. Kimble v. Willey, 204
F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1953). In the latter case, the owner was given
the burden of removing the tenant from possession. Failing to remove
the tenant allowed adverse possession to continue despite the lease
between the tenant and the true record owner.
In the principal case the burden of removing the tenant who
acknowledged the record owner's title was placed on the landlord,
the court reasoning that the law should range itself on the side of
protecting rather than undermining ownership. Thus, between the
true record owner of the land who had received acknowledgement
of his title from the tenant in possession of the land and the landlord who did nothing after learning of his tenant's recognition of
the owner's title, the principal case favored the owner. Apparently
the landlord could have continued his adverse possession of the land
by removing his disloyal tenant. Coyle v. Franklin, 54 Fed. 644 (5th
Cir. 1893).
It is well settled that one in adverse possession in his own right who
acknowledges a tenancy relationship to another destroys his adverse
claim. Boyles v. Red, 227 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error
ref. If the principal case had allowed the adverse possession to continue, despite the attornment of the tenant to the true record owner,
then the trespassing landlord would have been allowed to assert
greater rights by use of a tenant than he could have asserted if he had
personally been in possession and made the attornment. Such a view
would give to the landlord-tenant relationship an "unqualified supremacy over all persons," as was done in the Kimble case, supra.
The landlord-tenant relationship is only a vehicle by which the
landlord's open, hostile, and continuous claim of the owner's land
is made. In the principal case this vehicle collapsed and, as to the
owner, lost its hostility. It is submitted that there is no rational ground
whatever upon which the court could have held that the owner's land
was possessed adversely merely because the landlord desired that his
tenant so hold.

Carroll Jarnagin
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Regulation of Business-Fair Trade-Integrated
Distributors
Defendant corporation manufactures a line of trademarked drugs
which it markets through independent wholesalers and through its
own wholesaling division. Defendant's wholesaling division and
manufacturing division are under separate management, but are part

of the same corporation. In some areas defendant's wholesaling division
is in direct competition with the independent wholesalers to whom
its manufacturing division sells. Defendant entered into fair-trade

agreements fixing resale prices with a number of independent wholesalers. The government brought a civil action for injunctive relief
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Held: Price fixing agreements
are illegal per se, notwithstanding the fact that they are made by

integrated manufacturer-wholesalers, if the effect is to fix prices between parties competing on the same functional level. United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, "[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States" is illegal. 26 STAT.
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1952). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that price fixing agreements are illegal
per se regardless of their effect on interstate commerce. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940). On the other hand, most
of the states have enacted "fair-trade" acts which permit the vertical
fixing of prices (i.e., between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or
between a wholesaler and a retailer) by the distributor of a branded
or trade-marked product. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. C. 121'/2 § 188
et seq. (1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78 § 41 (1951); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. § 369-a. The purpose of such acts is to protect the property
interest of the distributor in the good will and prestige attached to
his trademark. Such state statutes do not, however, give the vertical
price fixing agreements immunity from the operation of the Sherman Act, and are illegal in the absence of approval by Congress. Dr.

Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
This approval was granted by Congress in 1937 by the MillerTydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1952), which
amended the Sherman Act by making resale price maintenance contracts entered into by manufacturers of branded or trade-marked products lawful if such contracts were authorized by state law. Since the
early fair-trade statutes were binding only on contracting parties,
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price cutting by nonsigners often thwarted the purpose of the acts.
The states soon amended their statutes to make nonsigners, who had
notice of the price-fixing contracts, liable in civil actions. See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. C. 121
§ 189 (1955); N. M. STAT. ANN. 549-2-2
(1953); LA. REV. STAT. 5 51:394 (1950); ARK. STAT. 5 70:206
(1947). In 1951 the Supreme Court held that the Miller-Tydings
Act exempted only consensual contracts or agreements from the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act and that contracts seeking to bind
nonsigners under state laws were thus illegal per se. Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S.384 (1951). This decision
prompted the McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952),
with the result that the "non-signer" provisions of the typical state
act now enjoy exemption from the Sherman Act. By virtue of the
McGuire Act any price cutting distributor is subject to injunctive or
damage proceedings for any departure from the fair trade price.
ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE

TO

STUDY

THE

151 (1955).
Both the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act are restricted
to those agreements in which the commodity affected is in "free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class." Immunity from the Sherman Act was denied, however, to contracts
entered into by "persons, firms, or corporations in competition with
each other." Therefore, horizontal price fixing agreements between
those on the same functional level of distribution (i.e., between a
wholesaler and a wholesaler or between a manufacturer and a manufacturer) do not fall within the exemption of the Miller-Tydings
Act and are illegal per se. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,
Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); Bausch & Lomb Optical v. United States,
321 U.S. 707 (1944).
Because the defendant in the principal case operated as a manufacturer and a wholesaler, the price maintenance agreements involved
both vertical and horizontal aspects. It was the government's position that the price fixing agreements benefited the wholesaling division of the defendant just as if they had been made by that division because of the integrated character of the defendant's organization and that the agreements were thus horizontal and illegal.
It would appear that the contentions of the government and the result
reached by the Court are correct, in view of the Miller-Tydings
specific exclusion of agreements between parties "in competition with
each other." United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
It has been urged that even vertical price fixing agreements inANTITRUST LAWS
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evitably result in horizontal fixing of resale prices. Thus, if a manufacturer enters into agreements with wholesalers A, B, C, and D, re-

quiring them to resell at a fixed price, the economic effect is the
same as if A, B, C, and D, had entered into the agreement between

themselves. Adams, Resale Price Maintenances: Fact and Fancy, 64
YALE L.J. 967, 970 (1955). From this reasoning it could be argued

that it would not matter whether the manufacturer initiating the
contract is integrated or non-integrated, since the ultimate effect is
equivalent to a horizontal agreement. It has been argued further that
integrated manufacturer-distributors should have as much right to
protect the good will of their product as any other producer or distributor of a branded good. The interpretation of the statute in the
principal case will force manufacturers to choose between the benefits to be derived from fair-trade agreements and the benefits to be
derived from an integrated manufacture-distribution system. See

Weston, Resale Price Maintenance and Market Integration: Fair
Trade or Foul Play?, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 658 (1954).
It would seem, however, that the integrated manufacturer-distributor was properly excluded from the immunity of the Miller-Tydings Act. In the final analysis, the wholesaling division of the defendant was in direct competition with those independent dealers with
whom the defendant free-traded. The non-integrated manufacturer
who enters into fair-trade agreements with independent wholesalers
must base the resale price upon the average costs of distribution and
the average margin of profits taken by independent distributors. Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 175 (1954). On the
other hand, when an integrated manufacturer sets the fair-trade
price on a product the potential profits of its wholesaling division
may enter into the determination. The integrated manufacturer is
also in position to protect an inefficient distribution system by setting
resale prices at a level most advantageous to the wholesale outlet.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 147-148
(1948). This ability to protect integrated wholesaling outlets and
to take advantage of what amounts to horizontal price fixing is
heightened by the non-signer provisions of the McGuire Act. Since
the wholesaling outlet of a integrated manufacturer is likely to distribute only those products produced and fair-traded by its manufacturer, the fixing of resale prices by the manufacturer on all its
goods will allow the integrated distributor to operate in an artificially maintained market.
Don M. Dean
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Taxation-Deductions-nterest Paid on Debentures
A parent corporation issued 5Y4% debentures in 1930 in order to
purchase all of the assets of a certain company, and then conveyed
these assets to a subsidiary in return for all its capital stock. The
parent suffered a large operating loss each year due to the high interest paid on the bonds, but until 1934 this loss was off-set against the
subsidiary's profit by using the consolidated income tax return. In
1934 Congress repealed the statute that permitted the filing of consolidated returns. Thereafter, the subsidiary declared a $30,000,000
dividend out of paid-in surplus, issued 6% debentures to the parent
in that amount and from 1934 to 1938 deducted the interest paid
on the debentures as an ordinary business expense. The parent's income during these years was increased in an amount equivalent to the
interest paid by the subsidiary. The Commissioner disallowed the
deduction, contending that the payments were actually dividends in
disguise, and not interest on indebtedness. Held: Money paid to a sole
stockholder as interest on debentures is deductible for income tax
purposes as an ordinary business expense. Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1956).
Interest is compensation for the use of borrowed money, Deputy v.
DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), and is a deductible business expense
for income tax purposes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163. A dividend
constitutes a portion of the accumulated surplus or profits of the enterprise that is allocated to the stockholders in proportion to the
amount of stock they own in the corporation. Martindale v. Fiduciary Counsel, 133 N.J. Eq. 408, 30 A.2d 281 (1934). Although the
declaration of a dividend gives rise to a debtor-creditor relationship
between the stockholder and corporation, it is not a deductible business expense for income tax purposes. The cases generally hold that
money payments to security holders are deductible if the securities
are evidence of a debt, but not if they represent ownership in the
corporation. JordanCo. v. Allen, 85 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1949).
The nature of the securities in question must be decided on the facts
in each case. Commissioner v. T. R. Miller Mill Co., 102 F.2d 599 (sth
Cir. 1939).
The instant case can be reconciled with the existing law by showing that there is a binding debt, and not a sham transaction. Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1941). As in the principal case, a debt may
be created by using money or assets originally paid in as equity or
ownership in the corporation. Lansing Community Hotel Corp. v.
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Commissioner, 14 T.C. 183 (1950), aff'd 187 F.2d 487 (6th Cir.
1951). A debenture dividend may operate as a corporate distribution
and a simultaneous borrowing back. Commissioner v. T. R. Miller
Mill Co., supra. The securities in question in the principal case were
simple conventional debt instruments, and not hybrids having
characteristics of both debt and ownership certificates. There was a
definite maturity date, Jordan v. Allen, supra; an unqualified
promise to pay a fixed sum of money, Staked Plains Trust Ltd.,
2 T.C.M. 566 (1943), aff'd 143 F.2d 421 (1944); and an absence
of voting rights or any participation in the management of the corporation. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
All of these characteristics have been held important in determining
that securities in question in the respective cases were debt instruments and not evidence of ownership in the corporation.
The subsidiary complied with all of the legal requisites for creating a debtor-creditor relationship; the fact that the transaction was
handled in this manner to reduce taxes is not grounds for declaring
it invalid per se. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930).
On the other hand, if the taxpayer complies with only the legal
formalities and the transfer is without substance or business purpose, the Commissioner will disregard the form and treat the taxpayer as though there had been no transfer. Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935). In the case at bar the Commissioner applied
these principles and concluded that the transaction was in form
only, but the court overruled his decision and held that the payments
to the parent were interest on indebtedness and therefore deductible.
Had the dividend been declared and the bonds issued while the
taxpayer still could file the consolidated return, the question of tax
avoidance hardly could have been raised because the taxpayer would
have gained no tax advantage at the time. Since the subsidiary did
not declare the dividend until the parent had lost the privilege of
using the consolidated return to off-set the parent's operating loss
against the subsidiary's profit, there is strong evidence that the intent
of the taxpayer, an important factor in these cases, was to maintain
the tax advantage they had enjoyed while using the consolidated
return. Commissioner v. Meridian and Thirteenth Realty Co., 132
F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1942).
It would seem that the decision could have been rendered either
for the Commissioner or the Kraft Foods Company without ignoring or circumventing any of the principles of law involved, as the
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question appears to be one of fact and definition. One of the Tax
Court's functions is to ascertain the facts in each case, and since
the Court of Appeals has the same jurisdiction over the Tax Court's
findings of fact as it does over a District Court when a case is tried
without a jury, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482, it is submitted
that the appellate court here should not have reversed the lower
court's finding of fact unless it was clearly erroneous. FED. R. Civ.
P. 52. The ruling in the instant case apparently indicates that if the
deduction is to be disallowed, stronger evidence will be required to
show that the taxpayer's transactions were without substance or
business purpose and existed soley for the purpose of avoiding taxes.
C. Wayne Litchfield

